ADVISING A BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN THE FACE
OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
Brian K. Adams Jr. 1
The law appears relatively straightforward: “[a] for-profit benefit
corporation shall be managed in a manner that considers the best interests
of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, including the
pecuniary interests of shareholders, and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its charter.” 2 In fulfilling this obligation, a Tennessee
for-profit benefit corporation’s board of directors “shall not give regular,
presumptive, or permanent priority to the interests of any individual
constituency or limited group of constituencies materially affected by the
corporation’s conduct, including the pecuniary interests of shareholders.” 3
Despite this perceived clarity, neither Tennessee, nor any other
court for that matter, has yet to interpret the meaning of these statutory
provisions. 4 Accordingly, this Comment seeks to provide corporate
counsel with clarity in its role as an advisor to a Tennessee For-Profit
Benefit Corporation’s (“FPBC”) Board of Directors in the face of legal
uncertainty. Part I, explains the fiduciary duty obligations a board of directors owes to a for-profit corporation operating under Delaware law. 5
Part I describes the duty of care as applied in Smith v. Van Gorkom and
the duty of loyalty as stated in Guth v. Loft, Inc. 6 Part II opens with a re1J.D.
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view of the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 7 It then explains
how this norm influenced FPBC law. 8 Finally, Part III highlights three
provisions in Tennessee’s FPBC Act and how each relates to our role as
corporate counsel. 9
I. FIDUCIARY DUTY OBLIGATIONS UNDER DELAWARE LAW

The General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware
(“DGCL”) appoints the board of directors as the statutorily ordained
managers of the corporation. 10 Unlike Model Business Corporation Act
Section 8.30, 11 the DGCL does not include express “standards of conduct for directors.” 12 Instead, these standards must be ascertained from
judicial opinions. As the following discussion indicates, Delaware law
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See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”). Similarly, the Model Business Corporation Act provides:
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All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs
of the corporation managed by or under the direction of its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in
an agreement authorized under section 7.32.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006).
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006) (“Each member of the
board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith,
and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.”).
11

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH & LEE L. REV. 939, 947 (2017).
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subjects a board of directors to two fiduciary duties: (1) the duty of care
and (2) the duty of loyalty. 13
A. Duty of Care
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 14 the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed whether the directors of Trans Union Corporation reached an
“informed business judgment ... in voting to ‘sell’ the Company for $55
per share pursuant to the … cash-out merger proposal.” 15 To reach an
informed business judgment, the Board must inform themselves “of all
material information reasonably available to them.” 16 This is commonly
known as the duty of care. 17
In Smith, Trans Union Corporation’s shareholders brought a class
action lawsuit “seeking rescission of a cash-out merger of Trans Union
[Corporation]” into another company, or in the alternative, damages
from the Trans Union Board of Directors. 18 The Delaware Court of
Chancery ruled for the defendants. 19 It based its ruling, in part, on the
fact “that the Board of Directors’ approval of the [cash-out] merger proposal fell within the protection of the business judgment rule.” 20 In other
words, it ruled that the Board acted on an “informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company.” 21

See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(“The fiduciary duties owed by directors of a Delaware corporation are the duties of
due care and loyalty.”).

13

14

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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Id. at 874.
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Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
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Id. at 872–73.
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Id. at 863.
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Id. at 864.
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Id. at 870.
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Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed. 22 Contrary
to the Chancery Court’s findings, it found “that the directors of Trans
Union breached their fiduciary duty to their stockholders … by their
failure to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to
them and relevant to their decision to recommend the … merger….” 23 It
is likely that the Smith court would have reached a different result had the
Board:
•
•

•
•

Consulted with its Chief Financial Officer, Donald Romans, in
more detail on the adequacy of the $55 cash-out merger price;
Utilized their own investment banker, Salomon Brothers, whose
Chicago specialist in merger and acquisitions was known to the
Board and familiar with Trans Union’s affairs;
Insisted upon a forum in which they could ask questions and explore alternatives with senior managers; and
Received written documents outlining the terms of the merger
and adequacy of the cash-out merger price during the Chairman’s
20-minute oral presentation of the proposal.
B. Duty of Loyalty

In the leading case of Guth v. Loft, Inc., 24 the Supreme Court of
Delaware described the duty of loyalty as “a rule that demands of a corporate … director … the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not
only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation … but also
to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation….” 25 In other words, the duty of loyalty “mandates that the best
interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not
shared by the stockholders generally.” 26
22

Id. at 864.

23

Id. at 893.

24

5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).

25

Id. at 510.

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citing Pogostin v. Rice,
480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984)) (emphasis added); see also Stone ex rel. Amsouth Ban-
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II. SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION & FOR-PROFIT
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
There is considerable academic debate about whether directors
owe these fiduciary duties to the corporation or the corporation and its
shareholders. 27 As Professor Joan Heminway points out, “[s]ome decisional law describes fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and other
court opinions refer to duties owed to the corporation and its shareholders.” 28 In fact, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court expressed conflicting
views on this issue within the same opinion. 29
Despite this lack of clarity, “corporate law is often credited with
creating, hewing to, or reinforcing a shareholder wealth maximization
norm.” 30 Professor Haskell Murray reiterated this belief by stating:
corporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is
not limited to causes involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”).
BRANSON, ET. AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS:
LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY, 532, (3d ed. 2016) (“an ambiguity
frequently encountered by corporate directors, lawyers, and even judges is whether or
not directors owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, or to
the corporation alone.”).
27

28

Heminway, supra note 12, at 952.

Compare N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
92, 99–100 (Del. 2007) (“It is well established that … directors owe their fiduciary duty
obligations to the corporation and its shareholders [and] … must continue to discharge
their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business
judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”), with id. at 101 (asserting that “it is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties
to the corporation.”).

29

Heminway, supra note 12, at 939; see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684
(Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of its stockholders.”); see also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d
1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those
standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders.”).
30
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[T]he persistent common perception seems to
be that directorial duties require placing
shareholder wealth at the forefront. The
perception may stem from the pronouncements of courts in Dodge and eBay,
from various academic articles, from education in business and law schools, and
from the popular media. The perception –
as the phrase “shareholder wealth maximization norm” suggests – has arguably
risen to the level of a widely recognized
and influential norm. 31
This norm is credited by many as the primary driver behind the
creation of benefit corporation statutes. 32 A benefit corporation “is a
type of for-profit corporation organized under specially tailored provisions included in a state’s corporate law.” 33 As mentioned in Professor
Murray’s companion piece to this Comment, Tennessee adopted its ForProfit Benefit Corporation Act in mid-2015 and the Act became effective on January 1, 2016. 34 Therefore, corporate counsel for Tennessee
For-Profit Benefit Corporations must consider how the shareholder
wealth maximization norm effects their clients.
J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (footnote omitted).

31

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S.
Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 617 n. 24 (“The heart of the concern is
that a court will find that board members ... have breached an applicable fiduciary duty
by taking an action that the board determines to be in the best interest of the corporation but fails to maximize the financial benefits to shareholders. Two court opinions—
Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), an ‘old chestnut’ decided in the closely
held corporate context under Michigan law, and the more recent Delaware law opinion
in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010)—are typically used to support the argument that corporate management should fear this result.”).
32

33

Id. at 616

J. Haskell Murray, Examining Tennessee’s For-Profit Benefit Corporation Act, 19 TENN. J.
BUS. L. 325, 330 (2017).
34
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III. ADVISORY ROADMAP
The remaining portion of this Comment will highlight three provisions in Tennessee’s FPBC Act and how each relates to our role as
corporate counsel. Under Tennessee law, a Tennessee FPBC’s charter
must “include a statement regarding the purpose or purposes for which
the corporation is organized including one (1) or more public benefits to
be pursued by the corporation....” 35 Unlike traditional corporate statutes,
this statutory provision calls for a corporate purpose that is more specific
than “any lawful purpose.” 36
As mentioned above, “[a] for-profit benefit corporation shall be
managed in a manner that considers the best interests of those materially
affected by the corporation’s conduct ... and the public benefit ... identified in
its charter.” 37 When read together with the charter provision, it becomes
apparent that this “management provision directly connects the benefit
corporation’s expressed charter-based public benefit to the management
function.” 38 In addition to considering the public benefit identified in its
charter, the board must consider the “interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct.” 39 Note, however, that the board cannot “give regular, presumptive, or permanent priority to the interests of
any individual constituency … materially affected by the corporation’s
conduct.” 40
At the moment, it is unclear how courts will interpret this statutory requirement. It would appear that the shareholder wealth maximization norm would not apply to any judicial review of board decision mak35

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-104(e)(1) (2015).

Heminway, supra note 32, at 618 (“Most modern statutory corporate law provisions
outside the benefit corporation context typically allow a corporation to be organized for
any lawful purpose. . . . Benefit corporation statutes are designed to change that
norm.”).

36

37

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-104(d) (2015) (emphasis added).

38

Heminway, supra note 32, at 622.

39

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-106(a) (2016).

40

Id.
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ing in the benefit corporation setting. Yet, as Professor Heminway notes,
this “expectation[] may not be valid.” 41 Time will tell. 42 Until then, this
Comment suggests that corporate counsel adhere to the following steps:
1. Confirm that the company is operating under the intended
statutory framework; 43
2. Identify those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct and the public benefit(s) identified in its charter;
3. Inform the Board of its fiduciary duty obligations under title
48, chapter 28, section 106(a) of the Tennessee Code Annotated Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-28-106(a); and
4. Record the Board’s decision-making process in the company
minutes. 44

41

Heminway, supra note 32, at 633.

Heminway, supra note 12, at 971 (“litigation involving board decision making in benefit corporations may help us to develop a better understanding of optimal board processes that take into account a more inclusive consideration of constituents. Only time
will tell.”).
42

43 Heminway, supra note 32, at 614 (“a review of . . . Tennessee [For-Profit Benefit Corporation] filings suggests that well more than half were erroneously organized as benefit
corporations.”).
44

Id. at 624 n. 55 (TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-106(b) and (c) “provide that compliance
with the statutory duty prevents a director from being held liable, and allow[s] the corporation’s charter to provide that a ‘disinterested failure’ to satisfy the board’s express
standard of conduct does not ‘constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a
breach of the duty of loyalty’ for fiduciary duty and indemnification purposes.”).

